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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
vVY"COFF COMPANY, 
INCORPORATED, 
-vs.-
Petitioner, 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and JESSE 
R. S. BUDGE, its Commissioners. 
Respondents. 
) 
Case 
No. 9204 
Brief of Respondents in Opposition 
o·f P·etition for Writ o.f Revie-w 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are in general agreement with the State-
ment of Facts set forth in the brief of petitioner. How-
ever, some amplification is necessary. 
In Public Service Commission Case 4252 - Sub 2, 
... \pplicant \"Vycoff Company, Incorporated (hereinafter 
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referred to as Wycoff), stated at the hearing before the 
Commission that it ''would like to propose a restrictive 
stipulation as to the application before the Commission.'' 
(R. 1099) The proposed stipulation was presented, dis-
cussed and agreed to by Wycoff and certain protestants. 
(R. 1099-1106) The stipulation was reduced to writing 
by the applicant and the certain protestants (R. 1828-29), 
filed with, and accepted by, the Commission. (R. 1107) 
The stipulation provided in part as follows: 
'' 2. Applicant shall amend its application by re-
stricting the scope thereof in the following par-
ticulars: 
a. The application shall be limited to the 
transportation of shipments of not to exceed 100 
pounds upon a weight basis. Shipments shall not 
be separated for the purpose of avoiding this re-
striction." (R. 1828) 
In the Report and Order of the Public Service Com-
mission, in Case No. 4252 - Sub 2, issued January 21, 
1958, the aforementioned stipulation was included in par-
agraph 4 of the Findings of Fact and reads as follows: 
"4. Forty-two witnesses testified on behalf of ap-
plicant and one hundred and two on behalf of the 
protestants. During the hearing and before the 
bus lines has concluded the presentation of their 
evidence the following stipulation '""as entered into 
between applicant and the protesting truck line 
carriers: 
1. This stipulation is subject to the approval 
and acceptance by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Applicant shall amend its application by 
restricting the scope thereof in the following 
particulars : 
a. The applicant shall be limited to the 
transportation of shipments of not to ex-
ceed 100 pounds upon a weight basis. Ship-
ments shall not be separated for the pur-
pose of a voiding this restriction. 
b. Applicant shall not transport in ex-
cess of 500 pounds on a weight basis of 
such express shipments on any one sched-
ule each way operating over the routes 
and departing at the times set forth in 
Exhibit 2 in this proceeding, except that 
applicant shall be permitted to transport 
not to exceed 1500 pounds on a weight 
basis of such express shipments from Og-
den to Salt Lake City upon one of its 
schedules each day. 
c. The schedules referred to above shall 
coincide with the movements of the Des-
eret News newspapers and The Salt Lake 
Tribune newspapers as shown in Exhibit 
2, and one United States mail schedule 
moving north from Salt Lake City and the 
return of all such schedules to Salt Lake 
City. 
d. In determining the maximum weight 
limitation on any one schedule, all ship-
ments shall be aggregated regardless of 
point of origin or destination. 
e. Applicant shall not carry expess ship-
ments of the commodities sought by the 
application on northbound schedules fom 
Salt Lake City or southbound schedules 
from points north to Salt Lake City ex-
cept on those four daily schedules each 
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way designated on said Exhibit 2 as 
Schedules 2, 3, 4 and 5 and 2A, 3A, 4A, and 
5A respectively of Table 8 thereof. 
f. "Shipment" as used herein shall refer 
to commodities moving on a single bill 
of lading from one consignor to one 
consignee. 
3. In consideration of the Commission ac-
cepting the aforestated restrictive amend-
ment to the application, the named truck line 
protestants do hereby withdraw their oppo-
sition to the application and their protests 
stated thereon. 
Said stipulation was approved by the Com-
mission." (R. 1871) (Emphasis added) 
In its Conclusion in the same case, the Commission 
states: 
''CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing facts the Commission 
concludes that public convenience and necessity 
justify the granting of the certificate applied for 
within the limitations specified in the stipulation 
set forth m the foregoing findings.'' (R. 1878) 
(Emphasis added) 
In its Order in the same case, restriction ''a'' reads: 
"a. Applicant shall be limited to the transporta-
tion of items of not to exceed 100 pounds upon a 
weight basis. Shipments 'vill not be separated for 
the purpose of avoiding this restriction.'' (R. 
1878) (Emphasis added) 
In the 1958 case of Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, 
Inc., et al. v. HaZ S. Bennett, et al., 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 
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1061, this ( \nnt set aside the foregoing order "insofar 
as it affects the territory served by plaintiffs * * *.'' 
On February 3, 1959, the Public Service Commission 
issued an amended order in P. S.C. Case No. 4252- Sub 
~' in conformance with the decision of this Court in the 
/jake Shore J.lf otor Coach Lines case, supra. 
On December 21, 1959, a nunc pro tunc order was 
issued by the Public Service Commission correcting the 
orders of January 21, 1958, and February 3, 1959, in 
P. S. C. Case No. 4252 - Sub 2, so that the word ''items'' 
as used in restriction a. therein should read ''shipments'' 
and thus reflect the purpose and intent of the Commission 
in approving the stipulation referred to herein. (R. 1-2) 
(R. 19-20). But for the inadvertent use of the word 
''items'' in place of ''shipments,'' the restrictions set 
forth in the orders of January 21, 1958, and February 3, 
1959, are in all rna terial respects identical with the stip-
ulation referred to herein, although the latter order con-
tains a modification reflecting the opinion of this Court 
in the Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines decision, supra. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO, AND 
DID NOT ERR IN, ISSUING ITS NUNC PRO 
TUNC ORDER IN THIS MATTER. 
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PoiNT II. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PE-
TITIONER WERE NOT DENIED THROUGH 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC OR-
DER IN THIS MATTER. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO, AND 
DID NOT ERR IN, ISSUING ITS NUNC PRO 
TUNC ORDER IN THIS MATTER. 
It is a general rule of law that" all courts have inher-
ent power, independent of statute, to correct clerical er-
ors, at any time, and to make the judgment entry corres-
pond with the judgment rendered.'' 1 Freeman on Judg-
ments, Fifth Edition, p. 281. This principle serves the 
ends of essential justice, and is based upon sound public 
policy. 
According to 30A American Jurisprudence, J udg-
ments, p. 581 : 
''The furtherance of a justice is the principal rea-
son for the correction by a court of clerical errors 
in the records of its judgments, and for the entry 
of such correction nunc pro tunc, especially where 
the failure to make the nunc pro tunc entry would 
result in injustice arising from an act of the court. 
In such case, the judgment nunc pro tunc simply 
consummates what the court adjudged but imper-
fectly performed. * * * ''' 
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/)al'is v. Rudolph, ('f al. (Calif.) 181 P.2d 765, holds: 
"It is well settled that clerical errors in a judg-
ment, where they are shown by the record, may be 
corrected at any time, so as to make the judgment 
entry correspond with the judgment rendered. 
S\vain v. N aglee, 19 Cal. 127 ; Freeman on J udm., 
§§70, 71. And this may be done even after an 
appeal and affirmance of the judgment. Rousset 
v. Boyle, 45 Cal. 64." 
By analogy administrative tribunals possess inher-
ent power to correct clerical errors at any time and to 
make the judgment entry correspond with the judgment 
rendered. A contrary rule would deny agencies of gov-
ernment authority to correct error and injustice and run 
counter to the public interest. According to 42 American 
Jurisprudence, Public Administrative Law, p. 537-8, 
'' * * * administrative authorities have power to correct 
clerical errors in their determination, and to reconsider 
or modify them on the ground of fraud or imposition, mis-
take, surprise, inadvertence, or newly discovered evi-
dence, or to meet changed conditions, whether by reason 
of express statutory provisions granting the power of 
revision or by reason of principles applied by the courts.'' 
Thus in the early case of Bell v. Hearne, 19 Howard 
252, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
the general land office may cancel a patent erroneously 
issued in the name of one James Bell, and issue one in 
the name of John Bell. The court stated : 
'' * * * The question then arises, had the commis-
sioner of the general land office authority to re-
ceive from John Bell the patent erroneously issued 
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in the name of James Bell, and to issue one in the 
proper name of the purchaser~ And the question, 
in our opinion, is exceedingly clear. The commis-
sioner of the general land office exercises a gen-
eral superintendence over the subordinate officers 
of his department, and is clothed with liberal pow-
ers of control, to be exercised for the purposes of 
justice, and to prevent the consequences of inad-
vertance, irregularity, mistake, and fraud, in the 
important and extensive operations of that officer 
for the disposal of the public domain. The power 
exercised in this case is a power to correct a cleri-
cal mistake, the existence of which is shown plainly 
by the record, and is a necessary power in the ad-
ministration of every department. * * * '' 
In Hamer et al. v. Industrial Commission, et al., 
(Ariz.), 31 P. 2d 103, the court considered the question of 
whether the State Industrial Commission could issue a 
nunc pro tunc order, modifying the terms of an award 
and order, by changing the words "totally dependent" 
to ''partially dependent.'' The court held : 
"The first question is whether the award of July 
6th as amended and corrected on September 18th is 
properly before us and its effect. Petitioners con-
tend that the Industrial Commission had no power 
to set aside the award of July 6th and enter a new 
award except upon the application of an inter-
ested party within t\Yenty days after its entry. 
This contention is perhaps correct, as we under-
stand it, but the order entered on September 18th 
shows upon its face that it is not an award, but a 
correction of the record to show the award actually 
made on July 6th. It recites that the a'Yard of 
July 6th was to the parents as partial dependents, 
whereas it was erroneously made to read total de-
pendents. In truth it 'vas merely entering now 
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(September 18th) the award that was actually 
made (then) July 6th. We know of no reason why 
the commission should not have the power and 
right to make its records speak the truth. In Zagar 
v. Industrial Commission, 40 Ariz. 479, 14 P. (2d) 
472, we held that the commission had continuing 
power 'to alter, amend, or rescind its awards,' and 
this certainly would carry the right to correct its 
records to make them conform to its actual find-
ings and to speak the truth. The nunc pro tunc 
order of September 18th, being merely the correc-
tion of a record to make it speak the truth as it 
existed on July 6th, we think is properly before the 
court and should be considered in the determina-
tion of the award as to amount as also duration.'' 
See also 42 American Juris prudence, Public Administra-
tive Law, Sec. 17 4, and cases cited therein. 
We therefore submit that the Public Service Com-
mission has inherent power to correct clerical errors at 
any time and to make its orders correspond with the de-
cision rendered, and thus speak the truth. 
The question then becomes, What is a clerical error~ 
1 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, pages 283-284, 
defines the term as follows : 
" 'Clerical errors' as used in this connection ordi-
narily relate to the errors or omissions of the clerk 
in the entry of the judgment and are sometimes de-
fined or treated as though this were the only class 
of cases to "Thich the term might be properly ap-
plied. But 'clerical' is employed in a broad sense 
as contra-distinguished from 'judicial' error and 
covers all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are 
not the result of the exercise of the judicial func-
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tion. In other words, the distinction does not de-
pend so much upon the person making the error 
as upon whether it was the deliberate result of 
judicial reasoning and determination, regardless 
of whether it was made by the clerk, by counsel or 
by the judge. Mistakes of the court are not neces-
sarily judicial error. Thus, if the judgment or 
some provision in it was the result of inadvertence, 
as where the court was laboring under a mistake 
or misapprehension as to the state of the record 
or as to some extrinsic fact, but for which a dif-
ferent judgment would have been rendered, the 
judgment may be vacated or may be corrected to 
correspond with what it would have been but for 
the inadvertence or mistake.'' 
14 C. J. S., Clerical, p. 1202, sub voce Clerical error, 
sets forth this definition: 
''Clerical error. An error committed in the per-
formance of clerical work, no matter by whom com-
mitted; more specifically, a mistake in copying or 
writing; a mistake which naturally excludes any 
idea that its insertion was made in the exercise of 
any judgment or discretion, or in pursuance of any 
determination; an error made by a clerk in tran-
scribing, or otherwise, which must be apparent on 
the face of the record, and capable of being cor-
rected by reference to the record only. It has been 
said that a clerical error exists when without evi-
dent intention one word is written for another, 
when the statement of some detail is omitted the 
lack of which is not a cause of nullity, or 'vhen 
there are mistakes in proper names or amounts 
made in copying, which do not change the general 
sense of a record, and that it implies negligence 
or carelessness.'' 
10 
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School Dist. No. 95 v. Marion County School Reorg. 
Committee (Kart.) 208 P. 2d 226, considers the foregoing 
definition more narrow in certain respects than courts 
have held. 
Nevertheless, reference to the record will show that 
the appearance of "items" in restriction a. in the origi-
nal order of J a.nua.ry 21, 1958, and Amendment of Feb-
ruary 3, 1959, was a clerical error, the result of inadver-
tence. This is based upon the following: 
(a) The stipulation of Wycoff and its amended ap-
plication (R. 1828-29) use the word "shipments" in par-
agraph 2a. thereof. 
(b) The Commission approved the stipulation and 
the application of Wycoff was thus restricted, (R. 1871); 
the word ''shipments'' appears in the Commission's Find-
ings of Fact, in paragraph 4, a reproduction of the stipu-
lation. (R. 1871) 
(c) The Conclusion of the Commission was that a 
certificate be granted" Within the limitations specified in 
the stipulation set forth in the foregoing findings." (Em-
pha.s added) (R. 1878) Both the Stipulation and Find-
ings as pointed out use the word ''shipments'' not 
''items.'' 
(d) Nothing in the record justifies the use of the 
word ''items'' in restriction a. of the January 21, 1958, 
Order and the February 3, 1959, Amendment. 
11 
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(e) The Public Service Commission in the nunc pro 
tunc order in question stated that the use of the words 
''items'' was erroneous and contrary to the purpose and 
intent of the Commission, and the word should have been 
''shipments.'' 
· In stating that the word "items" in restriction a. of 
the orders in question was the result of inadvertence is not 
to··concede petitioner's interpretation of the orders. Re-
striction a. reads : 
''a. Applicant shall be limited to the transporta-
tion of items of not to exceed 100 pounds upon a 
weight basis. Shipments shall not be separated for 
the purpose of avoiding this restriction.'' 
Now what is the restriction referred to in the fore-
going paragraph~ The only prohibition that gives mean-
ing to the ''restriction'' of separating shipments is that 
of restricting an aggregate of items (shipment) to 100 
pounds. Petitioner's construction of the foregoing re-
striction renders the second sentence thereof a nullity, 
for we understand petitioner argues for a restriction of 
100 pounds to a single item. The entire order of January 
21, 1958, and the amendment of February 3, 1959, make 
sense only if '' i terns '' as used in restriction a. thereof is 
synonymous with ''shipments.'' 
However, the definition of the word' 'items'' is irrele-
vant. The word crept into restriction a. of the P. S. C. 
Order of January 21, 1958, through inadvertence; the 
amendment of February 3, 1959, erroneously reproduced 
12 
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the same defect. The error may be corrected, and was cor-
rected, by the nunc pro tunc order. 
PoiNT II. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PE-
TITIONER WERE NOT DENIED THROUGH 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC OR-
DER IN THIS MATTER. 
We note with some amazement the argument of peti-
tioner that it has been deprived of its constitutional rights 
and that the Commission is estopped from entering the 
nunc pro tunc order in question. With equal awe we note 
the ease with which petitioner sluffs off the question of 
estoppel on the part of Wycoff. Petitioner cannot press 
this approach without having tongue in cheek. 
Who proposed the stipulation upon which the Com-
mission based its conclusion~ Wycoff. (R. 1099) 
Who proposed that its application be amended and 
restricted in accordance with the stipulation~ Wycoff. 
(R. 1099; 1828-1829) 
Who co-authored, or approved of the use of, the 
word "shipments" in the stipulation~ Wycoff. (R. 1828-
1829) 
Who agreed that its'' shipments'' would be limited to 
not to exceed 100 pounds on a weight basis~ Wycoff. 
(R. 1828-1829) 
13 
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Who had notice of the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sion of the Commission in P. S. C. Case 4252 - Sub 2f 
Wycoff. 
How can Wycoff in good faith claim that the nunc pro 
tunc order denies it any property right, when the order 
in effect answers the prayer of Wycoff, and embraces the 
agreement of the petitionerf Wycoff was a participant in 
proposing, and agreeing to, the restricted scope of its 
application; it knew the Commission had approved the 
stipulation and it was the intent of the Commission to 
enter an order in conformity with the stipulation. We 
submit that Wycoff is not only estopped from pressing 
a,deprivation of due process argument, but that all prop-
.er~y rights to which it is entitled and for which it prayed, 
are secured through the nunc pro tunc order. 
Wycoff takes some comfort in the fact that Public 
Service Commission Order 4252 - Sub 2, has been con-
sidered by this Court in D.ake Shore Motor Coach Lines, 
Inc. et a.Z. v. Hal S. Bennett, et al., 8 U.2d 293, 333 P.2d 
1061, between the time of the issuance of the original order 
and the nunc pro tunc entry. 
We submit that such review by this Court does not 
prohibit the Commission from entering its nunc pro tunc 
order. As set forth herein the correction of clerical errors 
may be made at any time, 1 Freeman, Judgments, Fifth 
Edition, p. 281 ; furthermore, the scope of the review 
'proceedings in the Lake Shore JJ1otor Coach Lines deci-
sion, supra, involved the P. S. C. order only as it affected 
the plaintiffs and the areas they serve; this Court did 
14 
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not consider the order as it related to Wycoff and those 
protestants who entered into the stipulation. If any-
thing, the Court recognized that the application of Wycoff 
was "to haul commodities generally in shipments up to 
100 pounds'' and noted the Wycoff stipulation as filed 
with the Commission. 
To grant the petition of Wycoff in the matter before 
this Court would make an absolute mockery out of the 
Wycoff stipulation and the intent of the Public. Service 
Commission in approving the stipulation; it would make 
the rule permitting the correction of clerical errors a 
nullity. To allow Wycoff to capitalize on an inadvertent 
act of the Commission would foster injustice, redound to 
the distinterest of the public, and strip an administrative 
agency of the power to do justice and make its orders 
speak the truth. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition of Wycoff Company, Incorporated, 
should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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